Kidnappers Without Borders: An Epidemic in Need of Global Solutions by McGlamry, Caroline Gray
 
807 
KIDNAPPERS WITHOUT BORDERS: AN EPIDEMIC IN NEED OF 
GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 
Caroline Gray McGlamry* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 808 
II. BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 811 
III. WHY THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THE 
 KIDNAPPING EPIDEMIC IS INEFFECTIVE .......................................... 814 
A. Corrupt Government Officials .................................................. 815 
B. Kidnap and Ransom Insurance Policies................................... 817 
C. Efforts Taken by the International Community ........................ 820 
IV. AVENUES FOR PREVENTING KIDNAPPING MORE EFFECTIVELY ..... 825 
A. Addressing Financial Instability .............................................. 825 
B. Purging Corrupt Government Officials ................................... 826 
C. Properly Training Security Officials ........................................ 829 
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 831 
  
                                                                                                                   
 *  J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 2013; B.A., University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, 2009.   
808  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:807 
 
Kidnapping is a serious crime and a violation of individual 
freedom.  It undermines human rights, with adverse — and in 
most cases insurmountable — effects on victims and their 
family and community.  Recently, there has been a significant 
and alarming increase in this phenomenon in different 
countries, as well as in the methods used.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 4, 2008, fourteen-year-old Fernando Martí, the son of one of 
Mexico’s wealthiest businessmen, was riding through Mexico City in his 
family’s bulletproof sedan when armed men dressed in Federal 
Investigations Agency (AFI) uniforms stopped the car at a checkpoint.2  The 
driver was tortured and killed, the bodyguard was strangled and left for dead, 
and the boy was taken for ransom.3  Despite delivering more than $2 million 
in ransom, Fernando was never released, and, on August 1, 2008, his body 
was found stuffed in the trunk of an abandoned car.4 
In Barinas, Venezuela, the country’s poorest state, a three-year-old girl 
was kidnapped in 2009 from the Mi Jardín slum.5  After receiving 
information that the only thing of value the girl’s family owned was a 
refrigerator, the abductor advised the family to sell it in order to pay the 
ransom.6  
The Martí family tragedy and the kidnapping of the young girl in Mi 
Jardín are two examples of the kidnapping epidemic that plagues Latin 
America—a phenomenon that crosses economic and class boundaries.  
Furthermore, the rise in globalization has not ameliorated the problem, but 
                                                                                                                   
 1 PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORG. OF AMERICAN STATES, COMM. ON HEMISPHERIC  SEC., 
CP/CSH/SA-166/11, RECORD OF THE MEETING OF MAR. 3, 2011, at 3 (Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter 
CHS MEETING], available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&sour 
ce=web&cd=1&ved=0CDUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fscm.oas.org%2FIDMS%2FRedirect
page.aspx%3Fclass%3DCP%2FCSH%2FSA%26classNum%3D166%26lang%3De&ei=KhtBU
dGkAeqE2QXtk4GwBw&usg=AFQjCNEd7446g9bljZf7dCUHBldsjrhplA&sig2=6U09WbfcjB
NGPHAJaSTYlw. 
 2 Marc Lacey & Antonio Betancourt, A Boy’s Killing Prods a City to Stand Up to 
Kidnappers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at A8. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Simon Romero, State Ruled by Crime and Chávez Family, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at 
A4. 
 6 Id.  
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rather has contributed to the widespread problem of kidnapping.7  Among the 
areas of the world where this practice has become most prevalent, Latin 
America stands out as the most dangerous for kidnappings.8  Although Latin 
America constitutes only about 8% of the world’s population, almost 75% of 
all kidnappings take place there,9 including 80% of kidnappings-for-
ransom.10  In fact, in some countries, such as Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil, 
kidnapping has evolved from a crime into a business venture.11  Due to 
efforts to combat the universal “War on Drugs,” the drug cartels and gangs 
that afflict these countries have turned to kidnapping for ransom as an 
alternative source of income.12  As a result, many Latin American countries 
have enacted laws to combat kidnapping, establishing harsh penalties for 
those who engage in kidnapping practices and, in some countries, for those 
who simply engage in ransom negotiations on behalf of the victim or his or 
her family.13 
The UN Economic and Social Council addressed the issue of kidnapping 
in its March 2002 report, International Cooperation in the Prevention, 
Combating, and Elimination of Kidnapping and in Providing Assistance to 
Victims.14  In the UN resolution prompting the report, kidnapping was 
defined as the practice of “unlawfully detaining a person or persons against 
                                                                                                                   
 7 See Samantha Kenney, Note, Regional Shortcomings and Global Solutions: Kidnap, 
Ransom and Insurance in Latin America, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 557, 564–66 (2008) (noting the 
connection between rising kidnapping rates and the expansion of business in developing 
markets resulting from globalization). 
 8 Id. at 558. 
 9 Cecilia M. Bailliet, Towards Holistic Transnational Protection: An Overview of 
International Public Law Approaches to Kidnapping, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 581, 604 
n.126 (2010). 
 10 How to Address the Rising Risks of International Kidnapping, SECURITY DIRECTOR’S 
REP., May 1, 2001, at 6 [hereinafter Rising Risks of International Kidnapping], available at 
2001 WLNR 310569. 
 11 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 583; Maria O’Brien, Preparing for the Worst, LATINFINANCE, 
June 1, 2001, at 42, available at 2001 WLNR 13020596. 
 12 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 583.   
 13 See Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 937 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D. Tex. 
1996) (describing Colombia’s Anti-Abduction Act of 1993 and the penalties imposed for 
carrying out a kidnapping, engaging in ransom negotiations or participating in kidnap and 
ransom insurance contracts); see also Norma Gutierrez, Mexico: New Anti-Kidnapping Law 
Promulgated, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/ 
lloc_news?disp3_l205402412_text (describing Mexico’s newly enacted anti-kidnapping 
laws). 
 14 U.N. Economic and Social Council, International Cooperation in the Prevention, 
Combating and Elimination of Kidnapping and in Providing Assistance to Victims: Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2003/7 (Mar. 5, 2003) [hereinafter ECOSOC 
Kidnapping Report].   
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their will for the purpose of demanding for their liberation an illicit gain or 
any other economic gain or other material benefit, or in order to oblige 
someone to do or not do something.”15  The Resolution made clear that 
kidnapping is considered a serious crime and strongly recommended that all 
Member States adopt legislation addressing kidnapping.16  
Many states have attempted to carry out legislative reforms and to purge 
corrupt law enforcement officials to combat the problem of kidnapping.17  
Aside from increasing penalties for kidnapping and defining what 
aggravating factors enhance a penalty,18 several states have also targeted 
ransom payments by criminalizing the act, albeit with much milder penalties. 
In Colombia, the legislature passed Act 40, or the Anti-Abduction Act of 
1993, which voided insurance contracts covering the payment of ransoms 
and penalized those persons who participate in such contracts.19  The 
Venezuelan National Assembly passed a law in 2009 forbidding private 
ransom negotiation and requiring citizens to report kidnappings so that assets 
of the victim’s family can be frozen to prevent ransom payment.20  Despite 
this push to curb the growing incidence of kidnapping through national 
legislation and international cooperation, the epidemic continues to be a 
                                                                                                                   
 15 International Cooperation in the Prevention, Combating and Elimination of Kidnapping 
and in Providing Assistance to Victims, ECOSOC Res. 2002/16, para. 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/RES/2002/16 (July 24, 2002) (requesting a progress report on the world kidnapping 
situation) [hereinafter UN Resolution Requesting Report].   
 16 Id. para. 2 (stating that Member States should “adopt the legislative or other measures 
necessary to establish as a serious crime in their domestic legislation kidnapping in all its 
modalities”). 
 17 Most recently, Mexico passed the National Program to Prevent and Sanction 
Kidnappings (Programa Nacional para Prevenir y Sancionar el Secuestro).  New Program Is 
Created to Prevent Kidnapping, JUSTICE IN MEXICO PROJECT (June 30, 2011), http://justicein 
mexico.org/2011/06/30/new-program-is-created-to-prevent-kidnappings/.  The Program went 
into effect August 15, 2011, and was given a one-year trial period under the implementation 
and direction of the Attorney General’s Office.  The plan focuses on increasing unity among 
forces, citizen participation in the prevention of kidnapping, and providing more support to 
victims and their families.  Id. 
 18 See Bailliet, supra note 9, at 602 n.123 (noting Colombian punishment for kidnapping as 
10–20 years for simple kidnapping and 18–28 years for extortive kidnapping); see also 
Gutierrez, supra note 13 (discussing Mexico’s new law establishing increased penalties of 20–
40 years for kidnapping, 25–45 years for kidnapping when violence occurs against the victim, 
25–50 years for kidnapping if the abductors belong to public safety institutions, and 40–70 
years if the victim is killed).    
 19 Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 937 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
 20 Charlie Devereux, Venezuela’s Plague of Kidnappings, TIME (Dec. 29, 2009), http:// 
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1950227,00.html.  
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serious problem that affects thousands of families every year.21  Estimates 
indicate that anywhere from 12,500 to 25,000 reported kidnappings occur 
annually worldwide, although the true figures are estimated to be much 
higher.22 
This Note will discuss the current framework for addressing kidnapping 
in Latin American countries and the reasons why it has proven ineffective.  
This Note argues that there are three major reasons why current kidnapping 
prevention practices have been unsuccessful, and why a new international 
framework must be adopted: first, the affected countries are inundated with 
corrupt law enforcement officials who do not fully enforce existing laws; 
second, kidnap and ransom insurance policies are widely used to pay ransom 
demands, stimulating the growth of the criminal kidnapping market and 
promoting it as a viable means of income; third, the international 
community’s efforts to combat the kidnapping phenomenon in countries like 
Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico through measures such as Plan Colombia 
and increased law enforcement training support have been ineffective.   
Part II of this Note discusses the historical background of kidnapping for 
ransom and the factors that make countries, such as Mexico, Venezuela, and 
Colombia, so susceptible to kidnapping.  Part III assesses the problem of 
corrupt government officials, the negative legal and policy implications of 
kidnap and ransom insurance policies, and the insufficient actions taken thus 
far by the international community, such as the implementation of Plan 
Colombia and the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime.  Part IV argues that more stringent measures must be taken 
to help stabilize countries affected by kidnapping, and recommends ways in 
which the United Nations and its Member States can help eradicate corrupt 
practices and enforce legislation to deter kidnapping.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
Kidnapping is a crime that historically surges in times of social and 
economic transition.23  It was originally used as a means of combat between 
warring gangs, families, tribes, and other groups.24  In the past, kidnappers 
tended to target specific individuals based on gang, family or tribe affiliation, 
                                                                                                                   
 21 Kenney, supra note 7, at 566; Frank Zuccarello, Kidnapping for Ransom, ROUGH NOTES, 
May 1, 2011, at 84, available at 2011 WLNR 9740946.   
 22 Zuccarello, supra note 21 (noting these numbers only account for the reported 
kidnappings, which might make up only 10% of the kidnappings that occur).   
 23 Kenney, supra note 7, at 560. 
 24 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 583. 
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or political power, and carried out the crime to retaliate or to make a 
statement.25  Today, however, kidnapping serves a chiefly economic purpose 
and is an actual profession unto itself for many gangs and paramilitary 
groups that target civilians randomly or because of their perceived wealth.26  
The characteristics of the victims can vary depending on where the 
kidnapping takes place.  For instance, in Guatemala, victims are usually the 
children of wealthy local or foreign businessmen, and the kidnappings are 
sophisticated and well planned.27  On the other hand, in countries, such as 
Colombia and Mexico, the kidnappings range from those of opportunity, 
such as during illegal roadblocks where little discretion is used in choosing 
targets, to selective kidnappings that occur after a careful study of the 
economic potential and vulnerability of the victim.28  Many of these well-
organized kidnapping rings target CEOs and employees from wealthy 
multinational companies with operations in Latin America, as well as the 
families of professional athletes playing abroad.29 
The kidnapping numbers in Latin America are staggering.  In 2007, 
Mexico reported 438 kidnappings30 and a ransom market (money paid in 
ransoms) calculated at more than $100 million.31  Only three years later, in 
2010, the number of reported kidnappings peaked at over 2,000 according to 
data collected by the Mexican government.32  In Colombia, there were 
                                                                                                                   
 25 Id.  
 26 Id.  
 27 Kenney, supra note 7, at 568. 
 28 Id. at 585; ECOSOC Kidnapping Report, supra note 14, para. 23.   
 29 See Michael S. Schmidt & Simon Romero, After Abduction, A Search in Venezuela, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at B15.  Several relatives of professional Venezuelan baseball players in 
particular have been kidnapped recently.  “The 56-year-old mother of Victor Zambrano, a former  
pitcher for the Mets, was rescued in 2009 . . . . The 11-year-old son of Yorvit Torrealba, a  
catcher for the Texas Rangers, was abducted on the outskirts of Caracas the same year, along 
with two of the boy’s uncles.  The brother of Henry Blanco, a catcher for the Diamondbacks, 
was fatally shot in 2008 after being kidnapped near Caracas.  The mother of the former pitcher  
Ugueth Urbina spent more than five months in captivity before being rescued in early 2005.” Id.; 
see also Tracee Hamilton, Wilson Ramos and All Venezuelan Ballplayers Should Be Safe at 
Home, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/nationals/wilson- 
ramos-and-all-venezuelan-ballplayers-should-be-safe-at-home/2011/11/14/gIQAPwF6KN_stor 
y.html (noting that the Venezuelan baseball players are not usually the highest-paid, but that 
multi-million dollar ransom demands are made in hopes that the player’s team or the MLB pays 
out).   
 30 Dolly Mascareñas, No Help for Mexico’s Kidnapping Surge, TIME (Aug. 8, 2008), http:// 
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1830649,00.html. 
 31 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 604.   
 32 Nick Miroff, As Kidnappings for Ransom Surge in Mexico, Victims’ Families and 
Employers Turn to Private U.S. Firms Instead of Law Enforcement, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 
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approximately 465 kidnapping cases reported in 2008,33 and kidnappings 
generate an estimated $150 to $500 million in revenue a year.34  The 
National Statistics Institute estimated that in Venezuela, approximately 
17,000 kidnapping cases occurred between July 2008 and July 2009, giving 
Venezuela one of the highest kidnapping rates in the world.35  Even more 
astounding is the fact that these numbers are likely very low estimates due to 
massive underreporting by both victims and police.36 
Around the world, states with the highest kidnapping rates tend to be 
“failing states” where the laws are weak, corruption is rampant, and the 
government is fragmented.37  Failing states, which include Argentina, 
Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, and Guatemala, all have “high levels 
of poverty, unemployment, income inequality, stratified social classes, and 
lower development”—elements which lead to a state’s inability to fulfill and 
protect the economic and social rights of its citizens.38  
Unfortunately, the kidnapping phenomenon in failing states is a circular 
problem.  High levels of poverty and unemployment oblige people to seek 
alternative means of employment and steady incomes through participation 
in organized crime.39  Yet these organized criminal groups hinder the 
economic and social development necessary to reduce poverty and 
unemployment, perpetuating the need for organized crime in the first place.40  
In Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, teenagers as young as fifteen are prosecuted for 
kidnapping.41  Teenagers whose parents are out of work, and even those from 
middle-class families, are tempted by the high dividends that a successful 
                                                                                                                   
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022603384. 
html.  
 33 Nicholas Schmidle, Kidnapping: Business Is Booming, Countries Like Nigeria Are 
Recession Proof Growth Markets, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2009), available at 2009 
WLNR 24516090. 
 34 Luz E. Nagle, Colombian Asylum Seekers: What Practitioners Should Know About the 
Colombian Crisis, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 441, 448 (2004).   
 35 Schmidt & Romero, supra note 29. 
 36 Kenney, supra note 7, at 566.  
 37 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 582.  
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 609. 
 40 See Schmidle, supra note 33.  In an interview with a kidnapper, “De Don,” Schmidle 
discovered that De Don was a university graduate, but had been unable to find employment 
after graduation.  In an effort to support his family, De Don joined a gang and became part of 
a kidnapping syndicate, earning enough to rent an apartment, buy a Mercedes, support his 
family, and open a beauty parlor for his girlfriend.  
 41 Julian Cardona, Mexican Teens Turning to Kidnapping in Drug War City,  REUTERS 
(June 2, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/02/us-mexico-drugs-juarez-idUSTRE 
7513J820110602. 
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abduction can produce.42  According to one of the city’s juvenile judges, 
teenagers who are interested in kidnapping to make money typically obtain a 
gun on the city’s black market, start tracking a wealthy individual, and 
kidnap him or her, often on their own or with only a few others.43  In cities 
completely destroyed by the drug wars, opportunities for the younger 
population are few and far between, leaving them with joining a drug cartel, 
creating their own kidnapping rings, or leaving town as their only realistic 
options.44  Thus, it is not surprising that many seek the allure of kidnapping’s 
potentially high economic rewards.   
In addition to these less systematic efforts by individuals, many highly 
organized drug cartels have turned to kidnapping as a response to the War on 
Drugs.45  Efforts to eradicate the illegal drug industry have interrupted the 
cartels’ main source of revenue—drug trafficking—causing them to shift 
their focus to kidnapping for ransom to maintain funding for their forces.46  
For example in 2000, the Colombian and U.S. governments instituted Plan 
Colombia, a program designed to support the peace process with the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), stimulate the economy, 
reform the judicial system, and reduce the drug market by half.47  In 
response, FARC increased their number of kidnappings for ransom in order 
to compensate for the losses sustained in the drug market.48  This same trend 
can be seen in many other Latin American countries where the attack on the 
illegal drug market is inadvertently forcing gangs and drug cartels to find 
alternative sources of income.49   
III.  WHY THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THE KIDNAPPING 
EPIDEMIC IS INEFFECTIVE 
Current anti-kidnapping measures in Latin America have proven 
inadequate thus far for three primary reasons: the widespread problem of 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Id. (discussing Toby, a Mexican teenager currently serving an eight-year prison sentence 
for kidnapping, who stated that he made up to $45,000 per abduction).  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. (quoting Marc Marquez, the deputy chief of juvenile services in El Paso County, 
Texas, on the issue of teenagers engaging in criminal activities such as kidnapping: “All the 
businesses are shutting down, so what opportunities do young people have . . . . It is a vicious 
cycle.  By the time they are 15, they are so desensitized.”). 
 45 Jason Beaubien, Mexico’s Drug War Spawns Wave of Kidnappings, NPR (Aug. 26, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129426547.  
 46 Kenney, supra note 7, at 572. 
 47 Id. at 570. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.  
2012] KIDNAPPERS WITHOUT BORDERS  815 
 
corrupt government officials, the emergence of kidnap and ransom insurance 
policies, and the lackluster measures taken by the international community. 
A.  Corrupt Government Officials 
The number of reported kidnappings in states like Colombia, Mexico, and 
Venezuela are astonishingly high.50  The real rate of kidnapping in these 
countries, however, is likely much higher due to a lack of reporting often 
caused by fear of retaliation by the kidnappers, distrust in law enforcement, 
or distrust in the state’s ability to effectively negotiate with the kidnappers.51  
All of these factors are a direct result of the rampant corruption among 
government officials.52   
These fears are not unfounded.  Newspapers are constantly covering 
kidnappings for ransom, depicting the battle that families like the Martís face 
against criminal organizations and insurgency groups.53  Instead of turning to 
local authorities after being contacted by the kidnappers, the Martí family 
hired a private security consultant to negotiate with the kidnappers because, 
as Mr. Martí explained, “[t]hose who grabbed him were police officers, and 
the last thing we wanted was for the police to be involved.”54  After all, 
Fernando Martí was abducted at what appeared to be an AFI checkpoint, and 
the AFI is the federal agency charged with investigating kidnappings.55  
Unfortunately, Mexicans and others in high-risk Latin American countries 
have come to accept police corruption as a part of everyday life.  Because so 
many police officers have been connected to criminal dealings such as 
kidnappings, families like the Martís are hesitant to rely on their expertise 
when dealing with kidnappers.56  
                                                                                                                   
 50 See Miroff, supra note 32 (noting that the number of reported kidnappings in Mexico in 
2010 was over 2,000); see also Schmidle, supra note 33 (stating there were approximately 465 
reported kidnappings in Colombia in 2008); Devereux, supra note 20 (up to 9,000 
kidnappings in Venezuela); Schmidt & Romero, supra note 29 (stating that Venezuela has one 
of the highest kidnapping rates in the world, with an estimated 17,000 kidnappings from July 
2008 to July 2009). 
 51 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 609–10; see also Mascareñas, supra note 30 (stating that the 
Mexican Human Rights Commission believes less than one in three kidnappings are reported 
to the authorities in Mexico because of the lack of confidence in the law enforcement system); 
Devereux, supra note 20 (stating that as many as four out of ten kidnapping cases are never 
reported due to fear of corrupt police forces).   
 52 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 609–10.   
 53 Lacey & Betancourt, supra note 2. 
 54 Id.   
 55 Mascareñas, supra note 30.   
 56 Id.; Lacey & Betancourt, supra note 2. 
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Only days before Fernando Martí’s body was found, an entire family of 
six was found murdered in their home in the city of Jalisco, Mexico, as a 
result of a botched kidnapping that involved a police officer serving in an 
anti-kidnapping unit.57  One of the family’s sons was kidnapped by the gang 
and released after the ransom was paid.58  The gang went back and killed the 
entire family once they realized the family was aware of the police officer’s 
participation.59  Kidnappings involving law enforcement officials rightfully 
strengthen the perception that police in many high-risk countries are corrupt.  
As a result, many believe that they put themselves and the victim at greater 
risk by seeking police assistance in kidnapping cases.  Alejandro Gertz 
Manero, a former Mexican Attorney General, lamented the collusion of 
criminals with the police saying, “99% of the cases go unsolved.  So there is 
only a 1% chance of being caught, and even then, probably remaining free, 
because the local prosecutors are also corrupt.”60  Manero’s statements 
demonstrate the hopelessness of the situation and total lack of deterrence that 
security officials and current legislation have on kidnappers.   
In Caracas, Venezuela’s capital, there are an estimated five abductions 
per day, and sources within Venezuela’s Scientific, Penal and Criminal 
Investigations Unit (CICPC) have conceded that police are sometimes 
involved in kidnappings, and that even officers from CICPC’s anti-extortion 
and kidnapping unit have been investigated.61  Joel Rengifo, a former head of 
the CICPC’s anti-extortion and kidnapping unit, went so far as to estimate 
that, in Caracas, eight out of ten kidnappings had some level of police 
involvement.62  In 2009, Tarek el-Aissami, Venezuela’s Minister of the 
Interior and Justice, made the startling admission that police commit 20% of 
crimes in the country.63 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Mascareñas, supra note 30. 
 58 Fears About Cops Fuel Mexico Kidnap Outrage, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 21, 2008),  
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26334297/. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Mascareñas, supra note 30.  
 61 Devereux, supra note 20.   
 62 Venezuela: Police Corruption Blamed for Kidnapping Epidemic, SCOTSMAN.COM (May 30, 
2011), http://www.scotsman.com/news/venezuela_police_corruption_blamed_for_kidnapping_e 
pidemic_1_1667444.  
 63 Rory Carroll, Deadly Force: Venezuela’s Police Have Become a Law unto Themselves, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/06/venezuela-police-la 
w-themselves. 
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Likewise, in Colombia, drug gang arrests often include law enforcement 
officers, soldiers, and court employees.64  In June 2011, security officials 
detained thirty-nine alleged members of the drug gang the Rastrojos.65  Of 
the detainees, seven were police officers, two were soldiers, one was a 
Marine, and one was a court employee.66  It is no wonder, then, that the 
public’s perception is often that the police and the criminals are one and the 
same.67  
B.  Kidnap and Ransom Insurance Policies  
Governments recognize that because kidnapping has evolved into a 
business that nets millions of dollars each year, it will continue to thrive until 
it is no longer seen as a profitable enterprise.68  Unfortunately, the state 
police’s inability to guarantee citizens’ security has led to a dramatic growth 
in the number of private citizens willing to pay private security and insurance 
companies for protection against physical and financial destruction.69  
Multinational corporations and private individuals began purchasing kidnap 
and ransom insurance policies in droves in the 1980s.70  
Standard kidnap and ransom policies have five major components:  
 (1) Direct Loss—“coverage for loss resulting from the 
payment of a ransom demand resulting from a 
kidnapping or extortion threat”;71  
 (2) Expenses Incurred—“coverage for expenses 
incurred in obtaining the release of a kidnapped 
victim or resolution of an extortion threat”;72  
                                                                                                                   
 64 Hannah Stone, Arrests Point to Drug Gang’s Power on Colombia’s Pacific, INSIGHT 
CRIME (June 2, 2011), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/arrests-point-to-drug-gangs 
-power-on-colombias-pacific.   
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
 67 Carroll, supra note 63 (stating that a public opinion poll disclosed that 70% of 
respondents believed police and criminals to be practically the same).  
 68 Kenney, supra note 7, at 574. 
 69 Id. at 573. 
 70 Meadow Clendenin, Comment, “No Concessions” with No Teeth: How Kidnap and 
Ransom Insurers and Insureds Are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 741, 750 (2006). 
 71 ISO’s Kidnap/Ransom and Extortion Insurance Program, ISO.COM, http://www.iso.com/ 
Products/Policy-Programs/Kidnap-Ransom-and-Extortion-Insurance-Program-from-ISO.html 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2012).  
 72 Id. 
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 (3) Detention or Hijack—“coverage for various costs 
and fees associated with securing the release of a 
detained or hijacked person”;73   
(4) In-Transit Delivery of Property—“coverage for loss 
of money being delivered as ransom while in the 
care and custody of a messenger”;74 and   
 (5) Consultation—access to security consultants for 
preventative measures and experienced hostage 
negotiators.75 
The upside to these policies is that they provide victims the benefit of an 
increased likelihood of being reunited with their families.76  The downside, 
though, is that the practice of these insurance companies paying ransoms 
stimulates the growth of the criminal market of kidnapping by making it a 
viable means of survival.77  Thus, while the victims from families wealthy 
enough to afford kidnap and ransom insurance are more likely to survive, 
victims from poor families suffer disproportionately since insurance policies 
encourage kidnappings generally.78 
Therefore, the use of insurance policies to pay kidnapping ransoms is 
controversial.  On the one hand, critics argue that paying ransoms through 
these kidnap and ransom policies encourages kidnappers to continue in their 
line of work.  Due to the increased awareness of the existence of kidnap and 
ransom insurance policies79 and the media coverage of “successful” 
kidnappings where high ransoms are paid out, criminals and insurgents are 
encouraged to demand increasingly larger amounts.80  This, coupled with the 
fact that coverage by these policies seems to reduce precautionary incentives, 
                                                                                                                   
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Kenney, supra note 7, at 561–62.   
 76 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 609; see also Kenney, supra note 7, at 578 (stating that a kidnap 
victim is four times more likely to be killed by their abductors if they are not insured, in part 
because kidnap and ransom policies provide insured individuals with access to professional 
services when negotiating with the abductors).   
 77 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 609.  
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 572–73. 
 80 Rising Risks of International Kidnapping, supra note 10; see also Clendenin, supra note 
70, at 746 (discussing how multinational corporations have established precedent for 
kidnappers by paying out huge ransoms; for instance, in 1975 Sears paid over $1 million for 
release of an executive in Colombia; Exxon paid $14.2 million for the release of one of its 
executives, and an Argentine multinational company paid a $60 million ransom for an 
abducted employee). 
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has led critics to suggest that, if these policies continue, they should adopt a 
“no-payment” scheme in which they focus on preventative mechanisms and 
benefits such as access to professional negotiators and crisis management 
personnel, but should not cover the payment or reimbursement of ransoms.81   
On the other hand, those in favor of allowing kidnap and ransom policies 
point to the fact that there is no alternative.  With states unable to protect 
their citizens, wealthier families who are frequently targeted have little 
choice but to protect themselves physically and financially,82 or flee the 
country.83  As Thomas Hargrove, an American kidnapped by Colombian 
guerrillas and held for eleven months, explained, “[f]ire insurance has been 
known to stimulate arson, and life-insurance policies have led to quite a few 
homicides, too.”84  Yet, Hargrove asserts, “Are you going to quit taking out 
life insurance and fire insurance?”85 
For those who can afford the insurance, the answer to that question is no, 
if for no other reason than for the access to consultation and negotiation 
services, the fifth component of these kidnap and ransom insurance policies.  
As the only component not associated with compensation, these services 
likely make up the most important component for insureds.  The benefits of 
having access to security consultants for preventative measures and access to 
experienced hostage negotiators in the event of an abduction86 are important 
because the process of negotiating with kidnappers, if done properly, greatly 
enhances the victim’s chances of being returned safely.87  For citizens who 
are deterred from looking to the police for help as a result of corruption or 
distrust in the adequacy of police training, these policies seem to be the only 
viable alternative.  According to a member of the FBI’s kidnap response 
team in Latin America, without professional guidance, the victim’s chances 
of being released are diminished.88   
                                                                                                                   
 81 See generally Clendenin, supra note 70 (arguing that kidnap and ransom insurance 
should adopt a no-payment scheme so as to avoid undermining public policy, such as the U.S. 
“No Concessions” policy regarding the non-payment of ransom, or those promulgated by 
attempts at legislative reform in countries such as Colombia).   
 82 ECOSOC Kidnapping Report, supra note 14, para. 53 (indicating that kidnapping severely 
tests and damages family relations, particularly with regards to the family’s property).   
 83 See Kenney, supra note 7, at 574 (commenting on how leaving the country as a “refugee 
in fear” is an alternative to taking the daily chance of being abducted).   
 84 Schmidle, supra note 33. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Kenney, supra note 7, at 562.     
 87 Annette Haddad & Scott Doggett, Kidnapping-for-Profit Cases Growing Rampant in Some 
Countries, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 2, 2000, at H9, available at 2000 WLNR 3397656.   
 88 Id.; see also Kenney, supra note 7, at 578 (stating that “kidnap victims are [four] times 
more likely to be killed by their abductors when they are uninsured than when insured,” in 
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Additionally, good advice can lead to the downward negotiations of 
ransoms to a fraction of the sum originally demanded.89  The service thus 
mitigates the many risks in paying a ransom “incorrectly,” or recklessly.  For 
instance, if the ransom is immediately paid in full, it sends the message that 
there is more money available and thus the victim will often not be released 
until an additional ransom is paid.90  This problem can also manifest itself in 
the form of a second kidnapping, shortly after the first, for purposes of a 
double payment if a victim’s family too readily hands over a large ransom.91  
Thus access to experienced ransom negotiators is an important service that 
kidnap and ransom policies provide in the absence of meaningful services 
available from the police and other government agencies.   
One thing is certain: the purpose of kidnapping is almost always profit.  
Therefore, paying ransoms and meeting extortion demands, in whatever 
form, is counterproductive and serves to strengthen the resolve of criminal 
groups and to perpetuate the practice of kidnapping.92 
C.  Efforts Taken by the International Community 
According to the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, states have the duty to respect and ensure human rights for their 
citizens,93 and a state of impunity, where criminals go free from punishment, 
is “considered to promote the violation of human rights.”94  Consequently, 
over the last two decades many different international organizations, such as 
the United Nations and the Organization of American States, have addressed 
the kidnapping for ransom epidemic through conventions, resolutions, and 
treaties.  In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC).95  This 
document established a framework for addressing the growing problem of 
                                                                                                                   
large part due to the fact that those who are insured have access to professionals who know 
how to negotiate and handle the abduction properly). 
 89 O’Brien, supra note 11. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id.  
 92 ECOSOC Kidnapping Report, supra note 14, para. 52.   
 93 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171.  Although Mexico has not signed and ratified this Covenant, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries have, recognizing the importance 
of protecting human rights. 
 94 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 591.   
 95 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (entered into force Sept. 29, 
2003) [hereinafter UNCTOC].   
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organized crime and discussed the need for international cooperation.  The 
UNCTOC calls on governments to criminalize acts committed by organized 
criminal groups and to enact measures for confiscating the proceeds of 
criminal acts “by identifying, freezing, and seizing assets.”96  In addition, it 
asks signatories to cooperate with other Member States in collecting 
evidence and exchanging pertinent information regarding suspects who have 
fled the country and methods that have proven effective in curtailing crime.97  
The UNCTOC also encourages Member States to establish training programs 
for their law enforcement officers and to institute witness protection 
programs to encourage those citizens who may have information crucial for 
criminal convictions to assist the government.98  By 2005, most Latin 
American countries had ratified the UNCTOC, pledging their support to 
cooperate in the fight against organized crime, including kidnapping.99 
A criticism of the UNCTOC is that enforcement is left to individual 
nations.100  Critics suggest instead that mechanisms must be established to 
ensure that offenders are arrested, properly charged and prosecuted, and 
punished fairly.101  International organized crime specialist Andreas 
Schloenhardt supports the idea of creating an international agency tasked 
with investigating, prosecuting and punishing “transnational organised crime 
when national authorities are unable, incapable or unwilling to intervene.”102  
This would help prevent sophisticated criminal organizations from taking 
advantage of weaknesses in various legal systems and the uncooperativeness 
exhibited by many nations.103 
In 2003, the UN Economic and Social Council published a report entitled 
International Cooperation in the Prevention, Combating and Elimination of 
Kidnapping and in Providing Assistance to Victims, compiling information 
collected from Member States “on the practice of kidnapping and on relevant 
domestic measures that had been taken.”104  Based on this report, the UN 
                                                                                                                   
 96 Draft United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Mar. 2000), 
http://www.un.org/events/10thcongress/draft.htm.    
 97 Id.  
 98 Id.  
 99 UNCTOC, supra note 95.  The UNCTOC was ratified by Venezuela on May 13, 2002, 
by Ecuador on September 17, 2002, by Mexico on March 4, 2003, by Costa Rica on July 24, 
2003, by Colombia on August 4, 2004, and by Bolivia on October 10, 2005, to name a few.  
Id. 
 100 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 597.   
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 598.   
 103 Id. at 597.   
 104 ECOSOC Kidnapping Report, supra note 14, para. 1.   
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Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) prepared a counter-kidnapping 
manual “of proven and promising practices” for use in the fight against 
kidnapping.105  The manual outlines the different types of kidnappings and 
advises governments on appropriate legislation, preventative measures, and 
response plans, and includes a checklist for police investigators addressing 
negotiation, surveillance, and intervention techniques.106  Partially funded by 
the Colombian government, the manual is a product of contributions from 
experts in sixteen different countries.107  The irony surrounding this manual 
is that some of its contributors are officials in countries that have yet to curb 
the practice of kidnapping within their own borders.108  In an effort to 
promote the proper use of the manual, the UNODC has held a couple of 
“train the trainers” courses.109  One of these week-long training courses took 
place in Mexico City, Mexico in early 2009.110  Though these trainees 
included Mexican officials from the Attorney General’s office, its 
specialized Unit for Organized Crime, Crime Prevention, and state units of 
the Attorney General’s office, there were fewer than forty officials present.111  
In a country as large as Mexico where the federal police force alone numbers 
over 35,000,112 training forty officials on the practices promoted by the 
manual seems somewhat meaningless.  
In June 2010, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a 
resolution titled the Hemispheric Cooperation Against the Crime of 
                                                                                                                   
 105 International Cooperation in the Prevention, Combating and Elimination of Kidnapping 
and in Providing Assistance to Victims, G.A. Res. 59/154, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/154 
(Feb. 3, 2005) (requesting that a handbook on the fight against kidnapping be prepared) 
[hereinafter UN Resolution Requesting Manual].  The manual has only been published in 
Spanish.  MANUAL DE LUCHA CONTRA EL SECUESTRO, OFICINA CONTRA LA DROGA Y EL DELITO, 
NACIONES UNIDAS (UN) (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/southerncone/ 
/Topics_crime/Publicacoes/Manual_antisequestro_ONU.pdf.   
 106 UNODC Launches Manual of Best Practices to Counter Kidnapping, UNITED NATIONS 
OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME (Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/pr 
ess_release_2006_04_26.html. 
 107 Id.  
 108 Id.  Colombia is one of the main supporters and contributors to the manual and while the 
Colombian government has succeeded in reducing the number of kidnappings that occur, it is 
still a serious problem.    
 109 Id.  
 110 Stepping Up Counter-Kidnapping Work in Mexico, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & 
CRIME (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/stepping-up-counter-kidnap 
ping-work-in-mexico.html.  
 111 Id.  
 112 Elyssa Pachico, Mexican Federal Cops Quitting Nearly As Fast As They Join, INSIGHT 
CRIME (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexican-federal-cops-quitting-
nearly-as-fast-as-they-join. 
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Kidnapping and for Support for Victims.113  This resolution calls for many of 
the same initiatives identified in the UN General Assembly’s resolution, the 
International Cooperation in the Prevention, Combating and Elimination of 
Kidnapping and in Providing Assistance for the Victim,114 and even 
references the Member States’ responsibility to fully implement the 
obligations contracted to in the UNCTOC.115  Further, it resolves to increase 
preventative efforts and international cooperation and the exchange of 
information regarding kidnapping.116  The resolution also requests that 
information from Member States be compiled regarding their existing 
legislation concerning kidnapping for referential purposes117 and instructs the 
OAS General Secretariat to organize workshops for the exchange of best 
practices of combating kidnapping among States.118  However, the 
effectiveness of these requests is limited by the fact that the best practices for 
combating kidnapping involve advanced training methods and the use of 
technology such as that used by the United States, and not by fellow failing 
states.  Additionally, the OAS resolution, more so than the UNCTOC, 
highlights “the need for strengthened citizen and community participation in 
the implementation of security plans, as well as improved citizen trust in the 
public security institutions.”119 
Although conferences between Member States have been held to discuss 
the crime of kidnapping, these focus mainly on unilateral efforts taken by 
individual Member States rather than on comprehensive efforts put forth by 
OAS as a whole.120  In a meeting on March 3, 2011, Colombia again took the 
lead, speaking about the successful efforts implemented by their own 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Organization of American States, Hemispheric Cooperation Against the Crime of 
Kidnapping and for Support for Victims, AG/RES. 2574 (XL-0/10) (June 8, 2010), available 
at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/160855.htm.   
 114 UN Resolution Requesting Manual, supra note 105.  
 115 Id. (“RECOGNIZING that in the Declaration on Security in the Americas, the member 
states condemned transnational organized crime; renewed their commitment to confronting it 
by strengthening the domestic legal framework and multilateral cooperation respectful of the 
sovereignty of each state; and undertook to combat and define different crimes, including 
kidnapping, by fully implementing the obligations contracted by the states parties to the 
United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime . . . .”). 
 116 Id.  
 117 Id.   
 118 Id.   
 119 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 599.   
 120 See, e.g., CHS MEETING, supra note 1 (considering the topic of cooperation against the 
crime of kidnapping and discussing measures taken by Member States, particularly in 
Columbia and Mexico). 
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government.121  These efforts include a Colombian anti-kidnapping school 
that began its operations in 2003,122 and the creation of the Grupos de Acción 
Unificada por la Liberación Personal (Unified Personal Rescue Action 
Groups, GAULA), which joins together the police, military personnel, the 
Colombian Attorney General, and other activist groups123 to perform rescue 
operations and dismantle criminal gangs responsible for kidnappings.124  
While these measures have certainly decreased the annual number of 
kidnappings in Colombia, they have not eradicated the practice, which still 
affects hundreds of Colombians every year.125  Brigadier General Humberto 
de Jesús Carreño Guatibonza reported to the committee on an institutional 
audit program that involves Colombian officials advising other foreign 
agencies on kidnapping practices, and on international courses Colombia was 
organizing on the subject of kidnapping to be taught in 2011.126  It is unclear, 
however, whether and to what extent these actions were carried out.127   
While the international community has taken a more hands-off approach 
in an attempt to respect state sovereignty and conserve resources, bodies 
such as the UN and the OAS make recommendations at an elevated level of 
generalization that fail to really grasp the situation in these Latin American 
states.  Recommendations to adopt legislation that criminalizes kidnapping 
and foster international cooperation “through information exchange” are only 
helpful if they can be carried out effectively.128  As in Mexico and 
Venezuela, the number of kidnappings has not dropped as a result of laws 
passed imposing stricter punishments for those involved in the crime.129  This 
                                                                                                                   
 121 Id.  
 122 Eric Green, Latin America’s First Anti-Kidnapping School Operating in Colombia, 
STATE DEP’T PRESS RELEASES & DOCUMENTS (June 30, 2004), available at 2004 WLNR 
2491665.   
 123 The GAULA groups were established by law in 1996, and as of March 2011, there were 
twenty-six at the national level.  CHS MEETING, supra note 1, at 2.      
 124 Gaula Groups, EJÉRCITO NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA, http://www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php 
?idcategoria=113937 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).   
 125 CHS MEETING, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that the number of kidnappings reduced from 
nearly 2,900 to fewer than 300 from 2002 to 2010).  
 126 Id. 
 127 Id.  Guatibonza also reported at this meeting that training was conducted in Mexico, 
Brazil, Paraguay, Panama, and Honduras, and that direct consultations were carried out with 
Jamaica, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Brazil.  However, there was no mention of what this 
“training” entailed, its effectiveness, or whether or not it would continue to be carried out in 
the future.   
 128 UN Resolution Requesting Report, supra note 15, paras. 2–3.   
 129 Jeremy McDermott, Spike in Mexican Kidnappings in 2011, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 1, 
2012), http://insightcrime.org/news-briefs/spike-in-mexican-kidnappings-in-2011 (stating that 
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is because neither country has been able to enforce the laws in a manner that 
renders them useful.  
IV.  AVENUES FOR PREVENTING KIDNAPPING MORE EFFECTIVELY 
This Note suggests that in order to truly address the kidnapping epidemic, 
three objectives must be met: the financial instability of countries with high 
kidnapping rates must be addressed; corruption at the government level and 
within security forces must be eradicated; and security officials must be 
properly trained to deal with hostage negotiations.  
A.  Addressing Financial Instability 
As noted by OAS Secretary General Horacio Cecchi, “there is a link 
between poverty, exclusion, marginalization, inequality and citizens’ 
security.”130  Because kidnapping epidemics are often the result of systemic 
failure, issues such as a country’s financial instability must first be 
addressed.  The most appropriate political bodies to address these concerns 
are the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD)131 and the United Nations via the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  These organizations should be used to help fund two 
initiatives.  First, more jobs need to be created to increase employment levels 
and decrease the risk of citizens joining organized criminal groups as a 
means of procuring a steady income to provide for their families.132  Second, 
funding should be allocated to allow for a pay increase for police officers in 
order to increase the retention rate among officers and to discourage the 
                                                                                                                   
according to the NGO Consejo para la Ley y Derechos Humanos (CLDH), the average 
number of kidnappings a day in Mexico in 2011 was 32% higher than in 2010).   
 130 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 608 n.160.   
 131 What We Do, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (click 
on “About” and follow menu to “What We Do”).  The World Bank is divided into two 
branches: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) aims to reduce 
poverty in middle-income and creditworthy countries while the International Development 
Association (IDA) focuses on the world’s poorest countries.  Based on this distinction, it is 
likely that the IBRD would be the most appropriate branch of the World Bank to address the 
issues in countries such as Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, which likely do not qualify as 
the world’s poorest countries, but rather as middle-income countries dealing with widespread 
poverty in a large portion of the population.    
 132 See Schmidle, supra note 33 (noting that patterns of kidnapping around the world were 
almost inverse to that of the global economy and that in a recessionary environment the 
kidnapping rate goes up). 
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practice of bribery and corruption.133  Increasing the retention rate will 
ensure that trained professionals who have experience in dealing with 
kidnappers and criminal gangs will make up the majority of the police force, 
rather than new, poorly trained officers.  Additionally, increasing officer pay 
will encourage more people to pursue careers in law enforcement while 
simultaneously decreasing the likelihood of corrupt officials.134  Currently, 
police officers in many Latin American countries find themselves either 
teetering right above the poverty line, or even below it.135  That officers are 
underpaid and can often double or triple their monthly salaries by colluding 
with criminal groups is a factor that leads to corruption.136  Thus, the creation 
of a stable, well-paid police force would serve both as a means of ending the 
cycle of corrupt relationships between officers and gangs, and, more 
importantly, as a means of restoring public confidence and cooperation.  
Public confidence and cooperation are essential because without them, 
security forces are unlikely to be able to end the practice of kidnapping for 
ransom, even if economies become more stable. 
B.  Purging Corrupt Government Officials 
Corruption among officials at the local and federal levels must be 
eradicated so that citizens have confidence when turning to government 
officials for help in kidnapping situations.  
Studies point to several factors that weigh in on the prevalence of police 
corruption aside from low salaries.137  These factors “include the likelihood 
of being caught and the severity of the resulting penalty; the moral cost and 
the degree of personal commitment to the job; and the probability of 
suffering physical attacks, both in cases of agreeing or refusing to work with 
the gangs.”138  Thus an effective plan to decrease corruption would need to 
address all of these issues through measures such as tougher internal affairs 
                                                                                                                   
 133 Pachico, supra note 112.  Over the last four years in Mexico, eight out of every ten federal  
police officers left the force.  The salary for federal officers is about $900 per month, whereas  
municipal police officers are paid only about $300 per month.  Id.; see also Patrick Corcoran,  
Pay Rises Alone Won’t Break Chain of Police Corruption, INSIGHT CRIME (Sept. 29, 2011),  
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/pay-rises-alone-wont-break-chain-of-police-corrupti 
on (stating that Mexican police working in some of the most dangerous states are paid the least, 
finding themselves either teetering just above or even below the poverty line, while their 
counterparts in much safer states earn up to five times more). 
 134 Corcoran, supra note 133.  
 135 Id.  
 136 Id.  
 137 Id.  
 138 Id.   
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bureaus, vetting procedures such as polygraph and drug tests and financial 
evaluations,139 and protection for threatened police officers and their 
families.140 
In order to help with this process, it might be necessary to bring in outside 
help such as UN peacekeeping troops or officials who would be less 
susceptible to corruption themselves and more likely to make objective 
decisions.141  However, this strategy would need to be carefully implemented 
so as to avoid offending local law enforcement officials.  It would require 
government-wide cooperation, at both the federal and local levels, to allow 
UN officials to come in and examine the operations of government and law 
enforcement agencies.  In order to avoid the likelihood of corrupt officials 
banding together to render these measures useless, there should be some type 
of amnesty provision for officials previously engaged in corrupt practices to 
either turn themselves in for reduced reprimanding, or to resign without 
punishment.  
Although there is little precedent for an amnesty program dealing with 
kidnapping, these types of incentives are frequently used in other failing 
states across the globe to draw fighters away from militant groups and to 
enforce government plans.142  These plans elicit cooperation through the 
promise of complete amnesty and a viable alternative to a corrupt lifestyle.143  
                                                                                                                   
 139 Jeanna Cullinan, Veracruz, Mexico, Fires 980 Police in Corruption Purge, INSIGHT 
CRIME (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-brief/veracruz-mexico-fires-980-p 
olice-in-corruption-purge (discussing a “confidence test” being used in some Mexican states 
to help root out corruption, involving polygraph and drug tests, as well as psychological, 
financial, and aptitude evaluations).   
 140 Id.  
 141 What is Peacekeeping?, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, http://www.un.org/en/peaceke 
eping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).  A UN peacekeeping 
operation consists of military, police, and civilian personnel working together to provide 
security and peace-building support.  These missions are deployed in war-torn countries, but 
can also be established to protect civilians, protect and promote human rights, and assist in 
restoring the rule of law.  Before deciding to take on a mission, a country must invite UN 
peacekeeping forces and then UN Member States vote to pass a resolution.  Thus in order for 
this solution to work, Latin American countries first need to request UN peacekeeping 
assistance.  Id.  
 142 Senan Murray, Nigerian Amnesty Program Viewed with Caution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2009, at A9; see also Amnesty Act (2000) § 3(2) (Uganda), available at http://www.ulii.org/ 
ug/legislation/consolidated-act/294 (granting amnesty to Ugandans fighting under the Lords 
Resistance Army (LRA) and the assurance that they will not be prosecuted or punished in any 
way for their actions during the war).   
 143 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 142.  Here, the Nigerian government provided a sixty-day 
period for fighters from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) to 
come forward and turn over their weapons in exchange for a $13 daily stipend.  Id.  
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Latin American governments would have to provide similar incentives to 
their government officials in order for such programs to be successful.  Not 
only would they have to allow officers the opportunity to keep their jobs, but 
they would also need to include the promise of a pay raise, better training, 
and better personal protection for officers and their families to ensure that the 
benefit of coming forward outweighed the risk.144   
Because all security officials should receive a pay increase, one way to 
reward non-corrupt officers would be to suspend the application of the pay 
raise to those corrupt officers who come forward.  For example, a ninety-day 
amnesty period could be enacted, during which all government officials 
would have the opportunity to come forward and admit their participation in 
corrupt practices, as well as provide information to the government regarding 
their criminal contacts and connections.  However, a secure means of coming 
forward must be established to protect officers from the repercussions likely 
to be inflicted by angry gangs and drug cartels.  After this ninety-day period, 
the pay increase would go into effect, but would be suspended for a certain 
amount of time for those previously corrupt officials.  Although this time 
period would need to be sufficient enough to reward non-corrupt officials, it 
could not be so long that it deterred officers from turning themselves in.  A 
“grace” provision should also be included to allow those who do not 
originally come forward in the ninety-day period to do so, but at a greater 
expense.145  In the alternative, if an officer did not want to admit their 
involvement and provide the government with information (due to either fear 
of gang retaliation or other personal reasons), they should have the option to 
resign without penalty.146 
                                                                                                                   
 144 See supra Part IV.A (regarding the need for increased pay for police and security officials 
to prevent the need for income supplementation via corrupt practices).   
 145 This would require docking their pay for the increase in salary they had already received 
up to that point, or at least retroactively enough to make up for the fact that they failed to 
come forward during the original ninety-day time frame.  For example, if it was decided that 
former corrupt officials should have their salary increase suspended for six months, an officer 
who came forward one year after the ninety-day program would be docked for six months of 
his pay increase, plus an additional week for every month after the ninety-day period it took to 
come forward.  In this case, the officer would be docked a total of nine months of pay 
increase. 
 146 This does not necessarily mean that they should be afforded all benefits that may 
accompany a resignation from a government position under normal conditions, but rather that 
they would be discharged without penalty.  This is important because if these former officers 
are not able to get another job due to penalties associated with their resignation, they would be 
more likely to turn to the drug cartels and organized gangs as a means of providing for their 
families. 
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C.  Properly Training Security Officials 
The final strategy in addressing the international problem of kidnapping is 
to properly train security officials (including all local and state police, federal 
agencies, and other related government officials) so that they are able to 
enforce laws passed to deal with kidnapping.  This approach requires that 
officials be trained to negotiate with kidnappers in an appropriate way, which 
could vary depending on the stakes and risks surrounding the individual 
victim.147  If countries are able to drastically reduce the amount of corruption 
among officials and then properly train them to deal with hostage situations, 
the public will be more likely to trust in their abilities to secure the return of 
a loved one.148  This increased trust and reliance on police forces would have 
a couple of effects.  First, it would decrease the perceived need for kidnap 
and ransom insurance policies.  Although reimbursement for ransom 
payments can be important for a family, the cost of negotiation services can 
supersede the actual amount demanded in ransom, thus creating a need for 
insurance policies that require smaller payments for these guaranteed 
services if they are needed in the future.149  If security officials were trained 
and able to provide these services, citizens would no longer feel the need to 
invest in kidnap and ransom insurance policies.  Providing a viable state-run 
alternative would make it much easier for states to prohibit the purchase of 
these policies which incentivize kidnappers to continue their practices.   
Second, turning to state security officials instead of private companies 
would also have the likely effect of decreasing the number of kidnappings 
carried out generally.  One of the main reasons that gangs and individual 
criminals have taken up kidnapping is that the risk of being caught by police 
or prosecuted by the government is so low.150  If the police became more 
involved and punishments were actually enforced against kidnappers, the 
practice of kidnapping would lose its appeal as an easy means of 
supplementing income or funding drug cartels.   
                                                                                                                   
 147 See O’Brien, supra note 11 (discussing the importance of providing good advice during 
negotiations with kidnappers to avoid paying excessive sums and to ensure the victim is 
released unharmed).   
 148 Bailliet, supra note 9, at 609 (discussing how families often turn to private insurance 
firms rather than the state to negotiate with kidnappers because of corruption among state 
officials and their ineffectiveness in returning victims to their families).   
 149 Id. 
 150 Rising Risks of International Kidnapping, supra note 10 (stating that countries with weak 
central governments and law enforcement agencies often have higher kidnapping rates 
because kidnappers have less fear of retribution).   
830  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:807 
 
The question then becomes: What constitutes sufficient training?  
Colombia’s Anti-Kidnapping School provides a solid foundation on which 
other training programs can be based.  The school was established with the 
help of the U.S. Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, which provided a six-
year, in-country program starting in 2003 that included anti-kidnapping 
instruction and equipment.151  The school focuses on training officers in 
negotiation and rescue techniques, as well as on using technology to track 
and locate kidnappers and their victims.152  To date, the Colombian school 
has housed students from eighteen different countries; in two courses held in 
2011 alone, eighty students from different nations were present.153  
In order to be truly effective, however, the training of security officials in 
all susceptible states must be the rule, not the exception.  It is not enough to 
simply train a handful of officers from each state; rather, in order to really 
make these trainings useful, all officers required to deal with hostage or 
kidnapping situations must take part.154  Because Colombia’s training 
methods seem to be effective,155 a possible solution to the training deficiency 
in Latin America might be to turn Colombia’s anti-kidnapping school into a 
“trainers” training school, bringing in delegates from around the country and 
other Latin American states who would then take the knowledge imparted to 
them back to their city or country to establish local training schools.   
Ideally, all security officials would eventually be trained in negotiation 
skills, tracking down kidnappers, and other preventative measures.  
However, a reasonable starting place would be requiring all officers in 
specialty kidnapping units such as the GAULA groups in Colombia, the 
Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) in Mexico, and the CICPC’s anti-
extortion and kidnapping unit in Venezuela, to undergo such training.  
Though it might make more sense to start this training with all incoming 
officers to these units, this might undermine efficiency, as more tenured 
                                                                                                                   
 151 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE, FISCAL YEAR 2009 YEAR 
IN REVIEW (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/143139.pdf 
(discussing the six-year antiterrorism assistance program in Colombia and the final phase of 
the program, which specifically emphasized the establishment of a self-sustained training 
program using fully qualified Colombian instructors). 
 152 Id.  
 153 Representatives of 25 Countries Participate in Anti-Kidnapping Meeting in Bogotá, 
DIÁLOGO (Oct. 21, 2011), http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional 
_news/2011/10/21/feature-ex-2610 [hereinafter Bogotá Meeting]. 
 154 For example, in Mexico only forty officials of 35,000 federal officers were trained in 
practices promulgated by the UN’s counter-kidnapping manual.  This represents only .01% of 
Mexico’s security officials, and that includes only federal officers.  Pachico, supra note 112.   
 155 See Bogotá Meeting, supra note 153 (noting a significant drop in kidnapping numbers 
from January 2011 to June of 2011 as compared to the same months in 2010).   
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officers are unlikely to take orders from newer, less experienced colleagues.  
To avoid creating this friction, training should begin with the senior officers 
who head up the anti-kidnapping units.  This would at least ensure that those 
officers who are assigned to deal with kidnapping situations are working 
under the guidance of those who have undergone training in the appropriate 
techniques.  Eventually, all incoming officers should be sent to an anti-
kidnapping “school” or other training center as part of a mandatory training 
requirement before sitting for police exams.  Having all officers specifically 
trained to deal with kidnappers and hostage situations could decrease the 
number of officers who succumb to corrupt practices as a result of fear 
brought about by coercion on the part of gang members and drug cartels 
engaging in kidnapping practices.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the past few decades, kidnapping for ransom has become a widespread 
practice affecting thousands of victims and their families every year in places 
like Latin America.  Despite efforts by Latin American governments to 
combat the kidnapping epidemic through local legislation and enforcement, 
as well as the efforts of international bodies such as the United Nations and 
the Organization of American States, kidnapping for ransom continues to 
plague countries like Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela.  In order to truly 
eradicate the practice of kidnapping, the international community must 
partner with local governments and address kidnapping through more 
proactive, collective efforts.    
Instead of simply encouraging Member States to adopt anti-kidnapping 
legislation and to share information regarding kidnapping prevention 
techniques,156 the UN and OAS should provide meaningful assistance to 
governments through comprehensive training on effectively negotiating with 
kidnappers on a much larger scale.157  Additionally, because they are likely 
to be more objective, the UN should provide peacekeeping troops to aid in 
the process of eradicating corrupt officials in Latin American countries 
through the administration of vetting procedures.  These efforts, coupled 
with financial aid provided for by the World Bank’s International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund to 
help fund these training programs and the necessary pay increases for 
                                                                                                                   
 156 See supra Part III.C.   
 157  Thus, instead of holding training sessions for fewer than forty officials, mass training 
programs should be established to accommodate several hundred officers at a time.  See supra 
notes 110–13 and accompanying text.   
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security officials, are likely to see greater results than the measures being 
taken today. 
